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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Federal Trade Commission v. AT&T Mobility, LLC,1 the Ninth Circuit 
recently ruled that common carriers, whether or not they are acting in their 
common carrier capacity, are exempt from regulation under the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (FTC Act).2  The case concerned whether or not AT&T was 
liable, under the unfair and deceptive practices prong of the statute, for slowing 
down data services to customers who used too much data, even though many 
of these customers were under contract for “unlimited data” plans.3  
Although AT&T has long been recognized as a common carrier in actions 
pertaining to its landline services, its mobile services were not considered a 
common carrier at the time that the case was filed.4  Reversing the District 
Court’s denial of AT&T’s motion to dismiss, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the 
statue’s plain language and legislative history suggested that the exception was 
intended to apply to all actions by a common carrier.5  Thus, common carriers 
are no longer subject to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulation for unfair 
and deceptive practices.6  
Until the Ninth Circuit’s decision, courts and the FTC have interpreted this 
exception oppositely, i.e., to apply only when the common carrier was acting in 
its capacity as a common carrier.7  This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit 
decision is both wrong and will lead to bad results.  The decision is wrong 
because the court assumes that the plain language of the statute unambiguously 
closes to door to the FTC argument, which it does not.  The Ninth Circuit also 
said that even if the statute’s language was ambiguous, the legislative history 
suggests a ruling in AT&T’s favor.8  A closer look at the legislative history 
reveals that this is also untrue.  Because the statute is ambiguous and the 
legislative history is not clear, the FTC’s interpretation of the statute should win 
the day.  
II.  BACKGROUND  
A.  FTC ACT GENERALLY 
In order to respond to the growing concern over monopolies and their 
effect on consumers, competitors, and the marketplace as a whole, Congress 
                                                                                                                   
 1 835 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 864 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 2 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012). 
 3 AT&T, 835 F.3d 993. 
 4 Id. at 996. 
 5 Id. at 998–1003. 
 6 Id. at 1003. 
 7 See, e.g., id. at 996. 
 8 Id. at 999–1003. 
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passed the FTC Act9 in 1914.10  Of particular import in Congress’s decision to 
enact the statute was to create an administrative agency powerful enough to 
handle regulation of large corporations after the consolidation and merger wave 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.11 
The Act, among other things, allows the FTC to regulate “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,”12 and gives the FTC the 
power to enforce this provision through administrative proceedings, cease and 
desist orders subject to judicial review, and injunctive relief in federal courts.13  
The FTC uses § 45 of the Act to regulate a variety of business activities 
affecting commerce.  These activities range from violations of antitrust laws 
under the “unfair” prong14 to misrepresentation in advertising to consumers 
under the “deceptive acts or practices” prong.15  In the intellectual property 
context, the FTC has used § 45 to regulate things like the deceptive use of 
trademarks16 and patents.17 
To prevent the FTC from stepping on other regulating agencies’ toes, 
Congress inserted a provision exempting a number of different kind of 
institutions from regulation under the FTC Act.  The Act exempts: 
banks, savings and loan institutions described in section 57a(f)(3) 
of this title, Federal credit unions described in section 57a(f)(4) of 
this title, common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate 
commerce, air carriers and foreign air carriers subject to part A of 
subtitle VII of Title 49, and persons, partnerships, or 
corporations insofar as they are subject to the Packers and 
Stockyards Act, 1921.18 
This was not the original language in the Act’s exception. Congress later added 
the “insofar as” language to the Packers and Stockyards exception.19  As will be 
discussed later, Congress’s intent in amending the Act and the ramifications that 
                                                                                                                   
 9 FTC Act, supra note 2. 
 10 See generally Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and 
Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 98 (2003) (discussing the history and motivations behind the 
passage of the FTC Act and creation of the Federal Trade Commission).  
 11 Id. at 6.  
 12 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).  
 13 1 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW § 10:1 (2017).  
 14 Id.  
 15 See Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992) (FTC seeking cease and desist against 
Kraft for advertisements that misrepresented the quality and content of their cheese slices).  
 16 See Niresk Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1960).   
 17 Decker v. FTC, 176 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
 18 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012).  
 19 FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 835 F.3d 993 (9th Cir 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 864 F.3d 995 
(9th Cir. 2017).  
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this amendment may have are in debate.20 The language of the Packers and 
Stockyards exception is important for this Note because it helps color how the 
common carrier exception should be interpreted.  Some courts and 
commentators have said that Congress added this language to make a change in 
the way that those subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act were regulated,21 
while others argue that Congress was simply ensuring that lower courts were 
interpreting its existing intent correctly.22  
B.  COMMUNICATIONS REGULATION  
Generally, a common carrier is a business that holds itself out to the public 
as one that will carry goods or services indiscriminately so long as the person 
attempting to use the common carrier pays the going rate.23  Because the 
businesses hold themselves out to the public in such a way, they are generally 
regulated to a much higher degree, and they generally must do business on “just 
and reasonable terms.”24  Because of this, they must refrain from discriminating, 
for any reason, against those who want to use their services.25  
Although this distinction originally applied only to businesses engaged in 
transportation, Congress began treating communications companies as 
common carriers in 1910.26  Because of neglect by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, the federal agency tasked with common carrier regulation at the 
time, Congress created the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) with 
the Communications Act of 193427 and tasked it with regulating the 
communications industry.28 Many types of communications entities are 
implicated by the definition because they generally reward the carriage of the 
communication so long as the customer pays for the service.  This may include 
entities carrying radio, television, and cellular services.29  Recently, the FCC has 
reclassified broadband services as common carrier services.  Thus, many of the 
large corporations that consumers have the most contact with offer some form 
of common carrier services.  
                                                                                                                   
 20 Compare 835 F.3d 993, at 999–1000, with FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 
at 1097–99 (N.D. Cal. 2015), rev’d, 835 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 864 F.3d 995 
(9th Cir. 2017), and Crosse & Blackwell Co. v. FTC, 262 F.2d 600, 604–05 (4th Cir. 1959).   
 21 835 F.3d 993, at 999–1000.  
 22 262 F.2d 600, 604–05.   
 23 Common Carrier, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
 24 FTC v. Verity Intern. Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 58 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting James B. Speta, A 
Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 225, 255–57 (2002).  
 25 Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871, 878 (2009).  
 26 Id. at 879.  
 27 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–231 (2000). 
 28 Crawford, supra note 25, at 880.  
 29 See generally James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 225 (2002).  
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In an effort to reduce regulation and barriers to competition in the 
telecommunications industry, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 
1996.30  The main effect of the Act was to eliminate many of the cross-
ownership rules previously promulgated by the FCC.31  Under the previous 
regime, telephone and cable providers could not be owned by the same entity, 
nor could cable providers and broadcasting companies.  The Act has been 
heavily criticized as producing results that are adverse to its stated goals and 
furthering an antiquated regulatory framework in a rapidly changing 
telecommunications industry.32 
C.  RECENT DECISIONS IN AT&T CASES 
Recently, the FTC attempted to use its § 45 regulation powers to punish 
“data throttling” by AT&T.33  In 2007, AT&T became the sole provider of 
Apple’s iPhones and began to offer unlimited data plans.34  Under these plans, 
customers could pay a higher rate for their plan but be able to use as much data 
as they wanted without worrying about overage charges.35  In 2010, AT&T 
stopped offering these plans for unlimited data usage and began forcing 
customers to purchase “tiered plans,” where customers must pay a certain 
amount per month for a plan with a fixed data cap and extra charges for those 
who go over the cap.36  
When AT&T did so, it informed its customers that those who had 
previously purchased an unlimited data package would be able to keep their 
unlimited data plan, even after they renewed their contract.37  AT&T claims this 
excessive data usage harmed its overall network and in 2011 began “throttling,” 
or reducing data speed, of those on the unlimited data plan after the customer 
                                                                                                                   
 30 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).  The Preamble 
of the statute states that it is “[a]n Act to promote competition and reduce regulation in order to 
secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and 
encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.” 
 31 Kevin Ryan, Communications Regulation—Ripe for Reform, 17 COMMONLAW CONSPECTUS 771, 
789–91 (2009).  The Act also reduced restrictions on local telephone companies providing video 
services and increased the percentage of households that an individual broadcaster could reach.  
 32 See id. (arguing that the FCC’s regulatory framework is outdated and not suitable for the 
modern telecommunications industry); see also Scott Cooper, Technology and Competition Come to 
Telecommunications: Re-Examining Exemptions to the Federal Trade Commission Act, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 
963 (1997) (arguing that the combination of deregulation in the telecommunications industry 
under the Telecommunications Act, along with the increasing assumption of common carrier 
regulation by the FCC, could harm consumers).  
 33 FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 835 F.3d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 864 F.3d 
995 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id.  
 37 Id.  
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had used more than a specified amount of data in any given month.38  The 
FTC’s complaint against AT&T states that AT&T’s existing agreements with 
the unlimited data customers did not mention reduced speeds, AT&T did not 
inform unlimited data users of the data throttling at the time of renewal, and 
AT&T’s data throttling was not tied to any existing network conditions.39  In 
other words, customers who had gone over their data cap were throttled no 
matter if there was ample room on the network to support their use or not.40  
Although AT&T did tell its customers about the data throttling program, the 
FTC contended that its disclosures were inadequate to support its later 
actions.41  AT&T informed its customers through monthly bills sent prior to 
renewal, along with text messages and e-mails.42  According to the FTC, these 
disclosures were inadequate because the monthly bill disclosures did not inform 
customers of the degree of data speed reduction or the fact that the reduction 
would be imposed after the customers had exceeded their data limits, regardless 
of data congestion on the network.43  Furthermore, only a few customers 
received the e-mails and text messages.44 
Because of this, the FTC contended that AT&T engaged in both unfair and 
deceptive practices.45  This was unfair because AT&T “entered into numerous 
mobile data contracts that were advertised as providing access to unlimited 
mobile data, and that do not provide that [AT&T] may modify, diminish, or 
impair the service of customers who use more than a specified amount of data 
for permissible activities.”46  The practice was deceptive for much of the same 
reason, i.e., AT&T failed to tell its customers that it would effectively limit the 
use of their unlimited data plans.47  
This case presents an interesting question for the court because, although 
AT&T was and is considered a common carrier for much of its activity, its 
mobile services were not regulated by the FCC as a common carrier at the 
time.48  Since the language of § 45 states that the exemption applies to 
“common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce,”49 it was not 
entirely clear whether the FTC had jurisdiction to bring such an action against 
                                                                                                                   
 38 Id.  
 39 FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2015), rev’d, 835 F3d 993 
(9th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 864 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 40 Id.  
 41 Id. 
 42 Id.  
 43 Id.  
 44 Id.  
 45 Id. at 1090. 
 46 Id. (quoting the FTC’s Complaint).  
 47 Id. 
 48 FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 835 F.3d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 864 F.3d 
995 (9th Cir. 2017).  The FCC has since reclassified AT&T solely as a common carrier.  Id. 
 49 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012).  
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AT&T.  The court had to choose between a “status-based interpretation,” 
meaning that the common carrier exemption applies regardless of its capacity 
during the conduct complained of, so long as the entity is considered a 
common carrier in another context, or an “activity-based approach,” which 
means that the entity is only exempt from regulation when it is acting in its 
capacity as a common carrier.50  In ruling for the FTC, the district court used 
the statutory language, legislative history before the Act, and subsequent 
amendments.51  
First, the court examined the statutory language.52  It looked at the meaning 
of the term “common carrier” at the time of the statute’s passage.53  Common 
law only regulated entities as common carriers when they were acting in their 
capacity as a common carrier.54  The Court cited Santa Fe, Prescott & Phoenix 
Railway Co. v. Grant Brothers Construction Co.,55 which articulated a policy reason 
for this.  The court in Santa Fe stated that the purpose of regulating common 
carriers more closely is because the service that they provided as a common 
carrier was important to the public.56  Thus, regulating their activities outside of 
this context was unnecessary.57  
Furthermore, courts also chose the activity-based approach in the context of 
the Interstate Commerce Act,58 which was “Acts to regulate commerce” that 
§ 45 was referring to at passage.59  The court also determined that the “subject 
to” language in § 45 suggests that an activity-based approach was contemplated 
by those who drafted the act.60  
The court also took the legislative history of the FTC Act to suggest an 
activity-based approach.61  The court rejected AT&T’s argument that the 
common carrier exception was proposed to prevent regulatory overlap 
generally, pointing to Congressional debate at the time of passage suggesting 
that the purpose of the exception was to prevent overlap between common 
carrier regulations.62  This was also the approach taken by the Second Circuit in 
Federal Trade Commission v. Verity International, LTD.63 
                                                                                                                   
 50 See 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1091.  
 51 See id. at 1091–98. 
 52 Id. at 1091. 
 53 Id.  
 54 Id.   
 55 228 U.S. 177 (1913). 
 56 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1092 (quoting 228 U.S. 177). 
 57 Id.  
 58 Id. at 1092–93.  
 59 Id. at 1091.  The Communications Act of 1934, which created the FCC, was not passed until 
1934.  Id. 
 60 Id. at 1093.  
 61 Id. at 1093–94. 
 62 Representative Stevens, when discussing what entities would fall under the regulation, said  
[t]hey ought to be under the jurisdiction of this commission in order to protect 
the public . . . just the same as where a railroad company engages in work outside of that of 
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Next, the court considered which interpretation of the statue “illuminate[s] 
the meaning of the plain language.”64  Considering this, the court preferred the 
FTC’s interpretation because of the giant loophole that AT&T’s preferred 
interpretation would open.65  Simply put, AT&T’s interpretation would make 
no sense for Congress to create such a regulatory gap when enacting regulation 
to control the market power of large corporations.  Thus, this could not have 
been its intent when drafting the statute.  
It was of no consequence to the court that the FCC had taken full control 
over AT&T’s regulation because AT&T was not the only common carrier, and 
AT&T did nothing to show how that gap would be filled in other instances.66  
This would allow businesses to structure themselves in a way that would escape 
FTC regulation.67  The court referenced the FTC’s brief to note that this was 
not just a wild academic concern.68  Businesses could introduce small elements 
of common carrier activity and escape the FTC’s data and privacy regulation.69 
Google has expressed an intention to do just that.70 
The court says that, although it is clear that the activity-based solution is 
correct, the FTC’s continued insistence on this approach entitles it to Skidmore 
deference.71  Under this approach, an agency’s interpretation of its own statute 
is entitled to deference when the thoroughness of the agency’s consideration, 
validity of its reasoning, consistency with prior interpretations, and its 
persuasive power suggest its proposed interpretation.72  The FTC has fought for 
the activity-based approach at congressional hearings and in cases whenever the 
issue has been presented.73  The only possible interpretations to the contrary 
have actually been the FTC arguing that the entity being regulated was simply 
not a common carrier.74  Thus, the FTC’s consistency in this interpretation 
would likely entitle it to Skidmore deference. 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit took a different view of the statute’s language 
and history.  The court dismissed the pre-Act history cited by the district court, 
ruling that it did nothing to show how Congress intended to use the words 
                                                                                                                   
a public carrier.  In that case such work ought to come within the scope of this commission for 
investigation. 
Id. at 1094 (quoting 51 Cong. Rec. 8996 1914).  
 63 443 F.3d 48 (2006).  
 64 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1094.  
 65 Id.  
 66 Id. at 1096.  
 67 Id. at 1094–95. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 1095.  
 71 Id. at 1101.  
 72 FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 835 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 864 
F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 73 See id. (collecting instances when the FTC had demonstrated this view). 
 74 Id. 
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common carrier when it drafted the statute.75  The court ruled that the language 
of the other exceptions surrounding the common carrier exceptions were 
clearly status-based, which suggested that this exception should also be viewed 
as status-based.76 
The court noted that, considering the amendment to the Packers and 
Stockyard exemption in the Act, this recognition may cut away from the FTC’s 
proposed interpretation.77  Before the amendment, the common carrier and 
Packers and Stockyards exceptions contained the same language.78  By later 
adding the words “insofar as,” Congress clearly expressed intent to regulate 
corporations subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act with an activity-based 
approach.79  If it had this intent, why did it not add the same language to the 
common carrier exception?80  Furthermore, the court questioned why Congress 
even added the extra language to the Packers and Stockyards exception if the 
“subject to” language already indicated an activity-based approach.81   
The court of appeals also did away with the district court’s Skidmore 
deference conclusion.  Because of its interpretation of the Act’s language and 
the legislative history, the FTC’s consistent interpretation is erroneous and 
unable to overcome the doubt cast on it by the other factors.82 
III.  DISCUSSION 
The court of appeals’ opinion was wrong, both as a matter of law and policy.  
As to the law, the text of the statute is at best ambiguous and likely leads to a 
conclusion that an activity-based approach was contemplated by Congress.  
Although the legislative and subsequent history does not exclusively point to an 
activity-based approach, most of it does, especially when one takes into context the 
understanding of common carrier regulation at the time of passage.  As a policy matter, a 
status-based interpretation would lead to a large loophole in the law that would 
allow corporations to structure themselves to get around FTC regulation.  
There are likely instances where other agencies either cannot or will not take up 
the slack; and even in the event that another agency literally exists to regulate, 
the FTC’s broad regulatory power lends support to the proposition that it is best 
suited to regulate these non-common carrier activities.   
                                                                                                                   
 75 Id. at 999.  The court noted, “While these cases recognize a distinction between common 
carrier and non-common carrier activit[y] . . . they do not show that when Congress used the term 
‘common carrier’ . . . it could only have meant ‘common carrier to the extent engaged in common 
carrier activity.’ ”  Id. 
 76 Id. at 998.  
 77 Id. at 999. 
 78 Id.  Both exceptions contained only the “subject to” language.  
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 1003. 
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A.  LEGAL CONCLUSIONS 
The district court’s opinion is more persuasive because it properly weighs 
the common carrier exception’s text and history.  As a preliminary matter, the 
court of appeals’ reasons for rejecting the FTC’s proposed interpretation do not 
mean much.  It claims that the fact that the status-based interpretations in the 
exceptions for banks, savings and loan institutions, and federal credit unions 
suggests that the common carrier exception should be construed as status-based 
as well.  The language in these exceptions, however, may lead to the opposite 
conclusion.  The language in those exceptions contains no qualifying language 
like the “subject to” language before the common carrier exception.  The fact 
that Congress drafted these exceptions differently suggests that it meant for 
these exceptions to work differently.  
The court’s argument about the addition of the “insofar as” language before 
the Packers and Stockyards exception, though slightly more persuasive, also 
falls short of the mark.  The appeals court ruled that the addition of this 
language closed the door on the FTC’s interpretation because Congress clearly 
meant to add an activity-based status to businesses subject to the Packers and 
Stockyards Act.83  By not adding this language to the common carrier 
exception, it implicitly expressed an intention to regulate common carriers by 
the status-based approach.  This does suggest that AT&T’s interpretation is 
correct, but it should not be considered dispositive.  
First off, just a year after the addition of the “insofar as” language to the 
Packers and Stockyards exception, the court decided Crosse & Blackwell Co. v. 
Federal Trade Commission.84  This case ruled that the language in the Packers and 
Stockyards exemption (the same language currently in the common carrier 
exemption) suggested an activity-based approach before the amendment.85  
There were problems with businesses structuring themselves to get around the 
Packers and Stockyards exemption, and some lower courts were erroneously 
using a status-based approach.86  Congress added this language to ensure that 
this would not be possible.87  
There is, however, a decent argument that this should not matter.  The court 
may only move on to other interpretational techniques if the statute is 
ambiguous.  As the court correctly states in the AT&T Ninth Circuit decision, 
“[i]t is unnecessary to rely on legislative history to construe unambiguous 
statutory language.”88  Thus, even if Congress did not intend to create a status-
                                                                                                                   
 83 Id. at 999–1003. 
 84 262 F.2d 600 (4th Cir. 1959).  
 85 Id. at 605.  
 86 Id. at 604–05. 
 87 Id. at 605.  
 88 FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 835 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 864 
F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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based approach for the common carrier exception, it may have created one by 
adding the “insofar as” language to the Packers and Stockyards exception.89  
Considering the structure of the statute, however, the language here is 
ambiguous.  The fact that the banks, savings and loan institutions, and federal 
credit unions exceptions do not contain any qualifying language means that the 
exact same argument can be made for why this exception should be read as 
suggesting an activity-based approach.  If Congress clearly intended a status-
based approach, why did it add the “subject to” language to the common carrier 
exception?90  This creates ambiguity in the statute and allows the court to look 
at things like purpose and legislative history to determine how the exception 
should work.  
Once we turn to purpose and legislative history, it is clear that the activity-
based approach should win the day.  The best historical argument that those 
wanting a status-based approach have is the later addition of the “insofar as” 
language to the Packers and Stockyards exception.91  The history suggesting the 
FTC’s suggested interpretation, however, is more convincing.  When the Act 
was passed, courts used an activity-based approach when regulating common 
carriers under the Interstate Commerce Act.92  Furthermore, there is 
Congressional testimony from the floor of the House when the Act was passed 
suggesting an activity-based approach.93  Thus, the legislative history is more 
suggestive of an activity-based approach than a status-based approach.  
B.  POLICY RESULTS 
Another way that the Ninth Circuit decision may be criticized is because of 
the incentive that it creates for businesses to structure themselves in a way that 
escapes FTC regulation.  As noted in the FTC’s complaint, this is not an airy, 
academic concern.94  Google, for example, has already expressed an interest in 
becoming a virtual wireless carrier, which would exempt it from FTC regulation 
under the status-based approach.95  
Although there is no indication that Google has done so solely to escape 
FTC regulation, a look at the implications of status and activity-based 
                                                                                                                   
 89 Id. at 997. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2015), rev’d, 835 F.3d 
993 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 864 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 93 Id. at 1094 (quoting Rep. Stevens “[w]here a railroad company engages in work outside that 
of a public carrier.  In that case such work ought to come within the scope of this Commission 
for investigation.”).  
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 1095.  Since the court ruling, Google has actually enacted this plan, offering cellular 
service under Google Project Fi.  See PROJECT FI-, https://fi.google.com/about/ (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2017).  See also Brian X. Chen, While Limited, Wi-Fi-First Phones Are a Good, Frugal Bet, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2016) (explaining, among other things, how Google-Fi works).  
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approaches is useful in showing the negative consequences of solely status-
based regulation.  Google has been investigated numerous times by 
administrative agencies (both foreign and domestic) for violations of antitrust 
and consumer protection laws.96  It has had particular trouble with the FTC.  
For example, Google is currently under investigation by the FTC for possible 
antitrust violations stemming from its ownership of Android.97  In 2012, 
Google was fined over $20 million by the FTC for misrepresenting in its 
privacy policy the way in which it would use “cookies” to track internet data.98  
Making matters worse, the reason that the fine was so large was because this 
was an express violation of a previous settlement with the FTC.99  Thus, 
Google has shown a proclivity for activity that the FTC deems worthy to 
regulate.100  If the status-based approach were chosen, Google would be exempt 
from FTC regulation.  Even though agencies like the FCC may literally have the 
power to pick up the slack, it will neither have the experience or the tenacity 
that the FTC does in regulating many of these consumer protection and anti-
trust issues.  
It is true that the appeals court decision leaves the question of whether an 
entity may be exempt from FTC regulation when only a miniscule portion of its 
business derives from common carrier activities.  Practically, however, this does 
not soften the blow to consumers, especially in the telecommunications 
context.  Since a considerable infrastructure is required to carry out 
telecommunications services, it is unlikely that any entity could incorporate an 
insubstantial amount of a telecommunication common carrier service into its 
business.  
Companies that are already classified as common carriers will also be able to 
escape this kind of regulation.  Many of these companies have also had similar 
                                                                                                                   
 96 See generally Jack Nicas & Brent Kendall, FTC Extends Probe Into Google’s Android, WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 26, 2016, 3:33 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-extends-probe-into-googles-android-
1461699217 (examining the FTC’s current antitrust investigation of Google and a similar 
investigation in the past).  
 97 Id.  
 98 Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to Settle FTC 
Charges it Misrepresented Privacy Assurances to Users of Apple’s Safari Internet Browser (Aug. 
9, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/08/google-will-pay-225-million-
settle-ftc-charges-it-misrepresented.  
 99 Agreement Containing Consent Order, In re Google Inc., https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default 
t/files/documents/cases/2011/03/110330googlebuzzagreeorder.pdf.  
 100 Google has been in trouble with the FTC a number of other times not mentioned in the 
Note.  See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Google to Refund Consumers at Least $19 
Million to Settle FTC Complaint It Unlawfully Billed Parents for Children’s Unauthorized In-App 
Charges (Sept. 4, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/09/google-refun 
d-consumers-least-19-million-settle-ftc-complaint-it; Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, 
Google Agrees to Change Its Business Practices to Resolve FTC Competition Concerns In the 
Markets for Devices Like Smart Phones, Games and Tablets, and in Online Search (Jan. 3, 2013), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/01/google-agrees-change-its-business-pr 
actices-resolve-ftc.  
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kinds of trouble that Google has had with the FTC.  Take, for example, AT&T, 
who was forced to settle for over $100 million with the FTC in 2014 for 
overbilling its customers.101  Verizon has also been investigated by the FTC for 
§ 5 violations resulting from the issuance of unsecure internet routers.102  
Many other large and growing corporations could easily incorporate 
common carrier services into their businesses.  Amazon, for example, could get 
status as a common carrier by registering its Amazon Prime delivery trucks as 
common carriers.  Thus, a status-based interpretation of the exemption could 
provide companies with an incentive to add small elements of common carrier 
activity to exempt themselves from FTC regulation.  Given the FTC’s current 
ability to regulate these businesses, many of which are the large corporations 
that consumers have the most direct contact with, that could have large effects 
on the type of protection that consumers get from these corporations.  
Furthermore, although the FCC may regulate telecommunications common 
carriers, it does not have an important regulatory tool that the FTC does: the 
ability to order consumer refunds.103  The FTC has used its ability to order 
refunds as a powerful tool to regulate harm to consumers by 
telecommunications common carriers.104  Although the FCC has the ability to 
make consumer refunds a part of any settlement agreement,105 its inability to 
order the refund gives it less bargaining power required to enter the settlement 
agreement.  Since class action arbitration waivers will generally be upheld by 
courts106 and most telecommunications common carriers are large corporations 
that will generally have these provisions in their consumer contracts, consumers 
seeking redress for small wrongs will be largely out of luck.  
Aggregation of claims may make it cheaper for individual consumers to 
bring their claim.  For consumers seeking small amounts of redress, arbitration 
costs will sometimes outweigh the harm to the consumer, making it useless for 
consumers to bring small claims unless they are able to lump their claim 
together with others who have similar small claims.  Since many consumers 
have signed agreements with the corporations precluding them from 
aggregating their claims, they may not be able to get redress without FTC 
enforcement.  
                                                                                                                   
 101 Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, AT&T to Pay $80 Million to FTC for Consumer 
Refunds in Mobile Cramming Case (Oct. 8, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-relea 
ses/2014/10/att-pay-80-million-ftc-consumer-refunds-mobile-cramming-case.  
 102 Closing Letter from FTC to Dana Rosenfeld, Counsel for Verizon Communications, Inc. 
(Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/closing_letters/verizon-commu 
nications-inc./141112verizonclosingletter.pdf.  
 103 47 U.S.C.S. § 503 (2010).  
 104 Federal Trade Commission, supra note 101.  
 105 Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, AT&T to pay $7.75 million for letting 
scammers bill consumers for sham ‘directory assistance’ services (Aug. 8, 2016), https://apps.fcc. 
gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-340650A1.pdf.  
 106  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).  
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit’s recent ruling in Federal Trade Commission v. AT&T 
Mobility, LLC was legally wrong and will produce negative policy results.  
Legally, the decision was wrong as a matter of statutory interpretation.  The 
Ninth Circuit ruled that the text of the FTC Act’s § 5 unambiguously points to 
a status-based regulation of common carriers.  The statute, however, is 
ambiguous in light of other exclusions.  Thus, the court should look at the 
history and purpose of the statute to discern the common carrier exception’s 
meaning.  When history and purpose are considered, it is clear that an activity-
based regulatory approach was meant at the Act’s passage.  
As a policy matter, this decision would lead to a loophole in common carrier 
regulation.  Corporations will be able to add elements of common carrier 
services into their business and escape regulation from the FTC.  This will lead 
to significant effects on consumers, since the FTC is now tasked with carrying 
out much of consumer protection law.  Furthermore, common carriers such as 
telecommunications and internet service providers are almost necessary for 
daily American life and almost all consumers interact with these businesses in 
one way or another. Although other agencies like the FCC legally have the 
authority to pick up the slack, the FTC is the proper agency to undertake this 
role because of its immense experience in the consumer protection arena.  
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